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1. Preamble  
General philosophy of science (GPoS) is the part of conceptual space where 
philosophy and science meet and interact. More specifically, it is the space in which 
the scientific image of the world is synthesised and in which the general and abstract 
structure of science becomes the object of theoretical investigation. 
 Yet, there is some scepticism in the profession concerning the prospects of GPoS. 
In a seminal piece, Philip Kitcher (2013) noted that the task of GPoS, as conceived by 
Carl Hempel and many who followed him, was to offer explications of major meta-
scientific concepts such as confirmation, theory, explanation, simplicity etc. These 
explications were supposed “to provide general accounts of them by specifying the 
necessary conditions for their application across the entire range of possible cases” 
(2013, 187). Yet, Kitcher notes, “Sixty years on, it should be clear that the program 
has failed. We have no general accounts of confirmation, theory, explanation, law, 
reduction, or causation that will apply across the diversity of scientific fields or 
across different periods of time” (2013, 188). The chief reasons for this alleged 
failure are two. The first relates to the diversity of scientific practice: the methods 
employed by the various fields of natural science are very diverse and field-specific. 
As Kitcher notes “Perhaps there is a ‘thin’ general conception that picks out what is 
common to the diversity of fields, but that turns out to be too attenuated to be of 
any great use”. The second reason relates to the historical record of the sciences: the 
‘mechanics’ of major scientific changes in different fields of inquiry is diverse and 
involves factors that cannot be readily accommodated by a general explication of the 
major metascientific concepts (cf. 2013, 189).  
 Though Kitcher does not make this suggestion explicitly, the trend seems to be to 
move from GPoS to the philosophies of the individual sciences and to relocate 
whatever content GPoS is supposed to have to the philosophies of the sciences.  
 I think scepticism or pessimism about the prospects of GPoS is unwarranted. And I 
also think that there can be no philosophies of the various sciences without GPoS. 
Defending these two claims will be the main target of this chapter. Still, I do not 
want to contrast GPoS to the philosophies of the individual sciences. As I will show, 
there is osmosis between them and this osmosis is grounded on what I will call 
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‘Science in general’ and the two important functions GPoS plays vis-à-vis Science-in-
general: an explicative function and a critical function.  
 
2. What is Science? 
There have been various public debates about the nature of science, the most 
prominent being in the early Victorian period with William Whewell and John Stuart 
Mill as the main protagonists (see Yeo 1993) and in the early decades of the Third 
Republic in France, with Henri Poincaré among others playing a key part in it (see 
Paul 1985). But it was in the first half of the twentieth century that the issue of a 
sharp separation of science from non-science or pseudoscience became a major 
philosophical-analytical endeavour. 
 
2.1 Searching for criteria 
The Logical Positivists aimed to reform philosophy by making it scientific; hence the 
issue of what counts as ‘scientific’ was taken to be urgent. Moritz Schlick equated 
‘scientific’ with a certain way to be cognitively significant: “A proposition has a 
statable meaning only if it makes a verifiable difference whether it is true or false” 
(1932, 88). This came to be known as the verificationist criterion of meaningfulness. 
It rendered science distinct from metaphysics (aka speculative philosophy): 
metaphysics was meaningless, because unverifiable. But it also reshaped philosophy 
by taking philosophical assertions to be significant insofar as they are analytic: true 
in virtue of the meanings of their constituent words.  
But are scientific assertions, qua scientific, verifiable? The answer depends on 
how exactly we should understand the (modal) concept of verifiability: a statement 
is strongly verifiable if its truth can be conclusively established in experience, 
whereas it is weakly verifiable if its truth can be rendered probable by experience. 
The result is that, depending on what exegesis we may accept, we will get different 
versions of the criterion of meaningfulness—hence of what counts as ‘scientific’. In 
the thought of Logical Positivists, ‘verifiability’ moved from a strict sense of 
provability on the basis of experience to the much more liberal sense of 
confirmability. This was a significant shift. Given a claim of provability, many ordinary 
scientific assertions, for instance, those expressing universal laws of nature, would 
end up being unverifiable; hence non-scientific. Not so given a claim of 
confirmability. But, by the same token, and given the typically holistic nature of 
confirmation, there was no longer a sharp distinction between science and 
metaphysics (see Quine 1951; Hempel 1951).1 
Karl Popper (1963) denied that the evidence can have any bearing on the 
probability of a theory or a hypothesis, but he nonetheless argued that scientific 
theories can be falsified by the evidence. Popper took (the modal notion of) 
falsifiability to be the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science or 
pseudoscience. Scientific theories are supposed to be falsifiable in that they entail 
observational predictions which can then be tested in order either to corroborate or 
to falsify the theories that entail them. Non-scientific claims are not supposed to 
have potential falsifiers: they cannot be refuted. Unlike the Logical Positivists, 
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Popper did not want to separate science from metaphysics. For him, scientific 
theories emerge as attempts to concretise, articulate and render testable 
metaphysical programmes about the structure of the physical world (cf. 1994). Still, 
there was supposed to be a sharp demarcation between science and pseudo-
science.  
However, given that in all serious cases of scientific testing, the predictions follow 
from the conjunction of the theory under test with other auxiliary assumptions and 
initial and boundary conditions, when the prediction is not borne out, it is the whole 
cluster of premises that gets refuted. Hence, it is not the theory per se that is 
falsified. It might be that the theory is wrong, or some of the auxiliaries were 
inappropriate (or both). As a result, any theory can be saved from refutation by 
making suitable adjustments to auxiliary assumptions. The point here is not that 
these adjustments are always preferable. They may be ad hoc and without any 
independent motivation. Hence the theory might be condemned, as Henri Poincaré 
(1902, 178) put it, without being strictly speaking contradicted by the evidence. The 
point, rather, is that qua a criterion of marking the bounds of the scientific, Popper’s 
falsifiability criterion fails (see my 2012 for details).  
Can we find solace in projects such as those associated with Thomas Kuhn (1970) 
and Imre Lakatos (1970)? Neither of them, to be sure, offered explicit criteria of 
demarcation. Yet they offered templates as to how science is structured and how it 
develops over time, which suggested that there are structural ways to capture the 
bounds of science. In (1977, 277) Kuhn suggested that “the surest reason” for 
claiming that some activity (e.g., astrology) is pseudoscientific is precisely that it 
lacks the right structure; that is, it is not governed by a paradigm-led puzzle-solving 
normal activity. But it follows that, from the point of view of an existing and 
established paradigm, a new rival and emerging theory is bound to count as 
pseudoscientific before it acquires the structure of a paradigm-led puzzle-solving 
normal activity; which is clearly something we do not want to accept.  
Lakatos (1970) too developed a structural model of science based on the claim 
that the unit of appraisal is not a single theory but a sequence of theories known as a 
Scientific Research Programme. In this way, he aimed to improve on Popper’s 
criterion, which was rightly taken to implausibly imply that theories are falsified and 
abandoned as soon as they encounter recalcitrant evidence. Lakatos emphasised the 
role of novel predictions in his own structural model. A Research Programme is 
progressive as long as it issues in novel predictions, some of which are corroborated. 
It becomes degenerating when it offers only post hoc accommodations of facts, 
either discovered by chance or predicted by a rival research programme. The price of 
this way to circumscribe the bounds of science is that there is no way to tell when a 
research programme has reached a terminal stage of degeneration. Even if a 
research programme seems to have entered a degenerating stage, it seems entirely 
possible (and it did happen with the kinetic theory of gases towards the end of the 
nineteenth century) that it stages an impressive comeback in the future. 
Expressing the sentiment of despair that was capturing philosophers of science 
after the so-called ‘demarcation debacle’, Larry Laudan noted in 1996:  
 
The failure to be able to explicate a difference between science and nonscience came as both a 
surprise and a bit of an embarrassment to a generation of philosophers who held, with Quine, 
that ‘philosophy of science is philosophy enough.’ Absent a workable demarcation criterion, it 
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was not even clear what the subject matter of the philosophy of science was. More 
importantly, the failure of the positivist demarcation project provided an important intellectual 
rationale for the efforts of relativists in the 1960s and 1970s to argue for the assimilation of 
science to other forms of belief since the relativists could cite the authority of the positivists 
themselves as lending plausibility to their denial of any difference that made a difference 
(1996, 23). 
 
 The problem, indeed, was and still is whether science loses any of its intellectual 
authority if it is not clearly and sharply demarcated from pseudoscience or 
nonscience. Is it the case that failing to circumscribe the boundaries of science has to 
lead to an undermining of the objectivity and epistemic reliability of science?  
This, note, is a serious and challenging question within GPoS. But the answer is 
negative. As Laudan himself noted (1996, 24) the epistemic problem is what makes 
scientific knowledge reliable and not what makes it scientific. Addressing this 
problem does not require, for instance, that creationism is proved to be 
pseudoscientific based on some general and sharp criteria. But it does require 
engaging with the epistemic status of the creationist theories: their relation to 
evidence, their integrability with other theories we have independent reasons to 
accept etc. And this presupposes the development of a rather general account of 
empirical support and confirmation which will make possible, among other things, to 
compare evolutionary theory and creationism and to show how and why the latter is 
epistemically defective. The point I want to stress here is that the very issue of how 
scientific theories are related to evidence and how theory-appraisal and theory-
choice should work is a central concern of GPoS, even in the absence of definite and 
rigorous ways to characterise creationism, or other endeavours, as pseudoscience.  
 
2.2 From essentialism to family resemblance 
Science does not have an essence waiting to be discovered by conceptual analysis 
and/or empirical investigation. An elegant thought, advanced by Massimo Pigluicci 
(2013), is that ‘science’ is a cluster or family resemblance concept, whose basic 
content is captured by a two-dimensional graph, where one dimension is theoretical 
understanding and the other is empirical knowledge. In this graph, the 
pseudosciences are supposed to occupy the space near the origin: “they all occupy 
an area (...) that is extremely low both in terms of empirical content and when it 
comes to theoretical sophistication” (2013, 24).  
However, unless there are objective measures of empirical content and 
theoretical understanding, it can always be questioned whether paradigmatic cases 
of pseudoscience are low on both. Pigluicci considers a related objection and argues 
that faced with a dilemma of abandoning astrology and creationism or claiming that 
“established sciences” are not genuinely different from pseudosciences “the choice 
is obvious” (2013, 204). Surely it is! But it is so, I claim, because there are plenty of 
epistemic reasons to trust, say, evolutionary biology and astronomy and virtually no 
reason to trust creationism and astrology. If there is something that genuine 
scientific theories have in excess over so-called pseudo scientific theories it is that 
they are supported—objectively speaking—by evidence; they have explanatory 
content; they cohere better with the rest of the theories in the scientific image of 
the world. In other words, they score a lot higher in the kind of evidential and non-
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evidential ‘metric’ that scientists have always employed to appraise theories.2 Still, 
Pigliucci’s overall approach is commendable because it stresses resemblances and 
common grounds between the various sciences as being enough for a general 
characterisation of science. James Ladyman (2013, 51) makes this point when he 
says that “(a) family resemblance certainly exists between the sciences, and the 
success of fields such as thermodynamics and biophysics shows that science has a 
great deal of continuity and unity”. This “theoretical simplicity and utility of the 
concept of science” is enough to make it useful even if science is so heterogeneous.  
Family resemblance is the key Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2013) attempt to answer 
the question ‘What is science?’ by stressing that what makes scientific knowledge 
distinctive (over other forms of knowledge) is that it is “systematic”, where 
systematicity is analysed along nine dimensions, including descriptions, explanations, 
predictions, completeness, systematic defence of knowledge claims, epistemic 
connectedness and others (2013, 27). Hoyningen-Huene advances his account as a 
descriptive theory, “describing what exists in science” (2013, 199). But this may well 
be its chief weakness, since as Hoyningen-Huene admits, he ends up with a “tenuous 
sort of unity among all of the sciences” (2013, 209), the reason being that the 
various ways to understand ‘systematicity’ (by means of the concretisations of each 
of the nine dimensions in each of the sciences and/or theories) lead to divergent 
meanings. It is of little consolation that all these concretisations of ‘systematicity’ in 
different disciplines, sub-disciplines and areas of research “are connected by 
multidimensional family resemblance relations” (2013, 209). For, what makes the 
relations of family resemblance possible is that all these disciplines are deemed to be 
members of the same family, viz., science, and what makes all these disciplines be 
members of the same family, viz., science, is that they are connected by family 
resemblances.  
In Hoyningen-Huene’s descriptive approach, the issue of whether scientific 
theories are supported by evidence is passed over (almost) in silence. One of the 
dimensions of systematicity—the systematic defence of knowledge claims—is 
obliquely related to looking for evidence for theories. But he insists that his approach 
is not evaluative; hence, it is not meant to say whether a theory is supported (or 
supportable) by evidence more than another; nor to compare, in terms of the 
success of representing reality, science with and other forms of knowledge (including 
pseudoscience) (2013, 173). This, however, will leave little or no room for a 
substantial criticism—within science and within GPoS—of various theories.  
The family resemblance approach has the advantage of avoiding the pitfalls of 
essentialism but it has the disadvantage of not adequately explaining where the 
(family) resemblance lies. In thinking about the question ‘What is science?’ it is 
important that we rely on our best exemplars of sciences and scientific theories and 
aim to mould a conception of science that characterises them. But if we stay at the 
level of family resemblances we might end up being too descriptive: science is 
whatever is being taught in science departments in universities. In my view, it’s best 
to proceed the other way around: first a conception of science, then the 
resemblance.  
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3. Science-in-General and General Philosophy of Science 
I want to argue that the object of study of GPoS is Science-in-general. And though 
GPoS is not here to legislate what science ought to be—independently of what is 
going on (and has been going on) in the various sciences—it is also the case that 
GPoS is not here to merely describe (or to provide a synopsis of) what the various 
sciences do. If a purely normative-evaluative perspective is spinning in the void, a 
purely descriptive perspective does not make room for grounded judgements about 
what is the best way to view science and how we characterise the unity there is 
among the various sciences, despite their differences. In particular, a purely 
descriptive perspective does not make room for a critique of science, that is of a 
critical engagement with science. In engaging with GPoS, we start with some 
theoretical conception of science and aim for a reflective equilibrium between this 
conception and actual and historical features appropriate to science and various 
knowledge-generating practices which are described or characterised as science. 
 
3.1 The two functions of GPoS 
GPoS fulfils two different but related functions and it requires both of them in its 
operation.  
The first function is explicative. It aims to explicate (that is, to render more precise 
and more definite) the various concepts that are employed by the various sciences—
and hence, to specify their common content as well as their differences and 
relations. For instance, it is hard to think of science without thinking of it as offering 
explanations of the phenomena under study, even if there is no overarching account 
of explanation that covers all paradigmatic sciences or sub-disciplines within them. It 
is equally hard to think of science without thinking of it as offering representations of 
the phenomena, as relying on models and as advancing theories. And, of course, it is 
even harder to think of science without some notion of experiment and 
experimental practice. Even if it turns out that, to give an example among the many, 
the concept of explanation, (or representation, theory and others) has different 
explications in the various sciences, all of these explications belong to the same 
genus and it is because of this that they are all concepts of explanation and not of 
something else.3 The very idea of conceptual pluralism is an idea within GPoS and its 
proper development requires GPoS—for admitting that there is no single concept of, 
say, explanation requires a standpoint from within which all competing concepts of 
explanation are examined and compared. And this is the standpoint of GPoS. 
The second function of GPoS is critical. It aims to criticise (in the Kantian sense of 
passing judgements on) the various conceptions of science as well as the various 
ways to present science, its methods and its aims. A key object, for instance, of the 
critical function of GPoS is to disentangle the part of scientific theories that is up to 
us and the part which is up to the world; or in other words, the contribution of the 
mind and the contribution of the world in our scientific image of the world. Another 
key object is to discuss the scope and limits of scientific knowledge and the 
epistemic credentials of the various factors (evidence, theoretical virtues etc) that 
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are involved in the acceptance of theories; or the relation between philosophy of 
science and history of science.4 
I will discuss these two functions later on. In section 4, I will present four 
dimensions along which these two functions operate. But before I do this, I want to 
explicate this idea of Science-in-general as the proper object of GPoS. 
 
3.2 A mode of knowledge as well as a discipline 
In thinking of Science-in-general as the proper object of GPoS, I follow two thinkers. 
The first is Aristotle. In the opening lines of Physics Book 1, Aristotle noted that 
episteme is both a kind of knowledge and a discipline. In fact, this kind of knowledge 
is what is shared by the various disciplines which are called sciences. Here is how he 
put it: 
 
When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, causes, or elements, it is 
through acquaintance with these that knowledge and understanding is attained. For we do not 
think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary causes or first principles, 
and have carried our analysis as far as its elements. Plainly, therefore, in the science of nature 




The science of nature (‘ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμη’ or scientiae naturalis, as 
Thomas Aquinas rendered it in his Commentary) is a kind of episteme, that is, it is a 
special way of knowing its subject matter. So from Aristotle, I take the idea that 
science is a special mode of knowing the world (or an intended domain of 
phenomena).  
The second thinker is Karl Marx, from whom I form the notion of Science-in-
General in analogy with his idea of ‘production in general’, which he put forward in 
the Grundrisse:  
 
Production in general is an abstraction, but a rational abstraction in so far as it really brings out 
and fixes the common element and thus saves us repetition. Still, this general category, this 
common element sifted out by comparison, is itself segmented many times over and splits into 
different determinations. Some determinations belong to all epochs, others only to a few. 
[Some] determinations will be shared by the most modern epoch and the most ancient. No 
production will be thinkable without them; however even though the most developed 
languages have laws and characteristics in common with the least developed, nevertheless, 
just those things which determine their development, i.e. the elements which are not general 
and common, must be separated out from the determinations valid for production as such, so 
that in their unity – which arises already from the identity of the subject, humanity, and of the 
object, nature – their essential difference is not forgotten (1857-8, 85). 
 
From this rich passage, I take the idea that Science-in-general is a rational 
abstraction. In actual point of fact, there are concrete theories and disciplines with 
rich and complex histories and structures. And yet, they all fall under a general 
category—science—aiming to capture a mode of knowledge of the world, which is 
subject to different determinations (both conceptually and historically), some of 
which are general and common to all sciences, while others are different. Neither 
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their unity, nor their differences should be neglected. To paraphrase Marx, their 
unity arises from the identity of the subject, viz., that science is a special mode of 
knowledge of nature, and from the identity of the object, viz., nature itself. Going 
above the various sciences to Science-in-general makes it possible to acquire a 
(reviseable and historically-conditioned) bird’s eye point of view which is necessary 
for viewing the various sciences as being parts of a common endeavour to 
understand the world and to acquire a coherent scientific image of it. As I put it 
elsewhere (2012a, 101): “Science as such is a theoretical abstraction and general 
philosophy of science is the laboratory of this theoretical abstraction”.  
 The Aristotelian idea that I have used is that the common core of science—what 
characterises Science-in-general qua an abstraction—is that it is a form of 
knowledge, and a concomitant set of practices and methods, which aim to achieve 
this form of knowledge. This form of knowledge—known as scientific—is 
characterised by a rather rigorous demand for justification as well as for external 
grounding to (at least some aspects of) reality. The demand for justification renders 
science an inter-subjective enterprise; the demand for external grounding renders it 
an objective enterprise. The specific determinations of the form of scientific 
knowledge change over time. And they change partly because of the critical function 
of GPoS, (until fairly recently performed by practising scientists themselves as well as 
by philosophers of science), which unravels problems in the dominant conception of 
scientific knowledge and its in principle achievability; and partly because of changes 
in the scientific worldview itself.  
Here is a quick illustration of the interplay between the abstraction that 
constitutes Science-in-general and its concrete determinations. The Aristotelian 
conception of episteme—qua certain knowledge of universal and necessary truths 
founded, ultimately, on induction on the basis of experience and demonstration 
from first principles—prevailed (though not uncritically and without challenges) for a 
number of centuries and was criticised and doubly transformed in the seventeenth 
century by the competing conceptions of Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes.6 The 
difference between Descartes and Bacon concerned both the origins of knowledge 
and the canons of theory appraisal and choice. But neither of them denied that 
scientific knowledge required strengthened security—though they disagreed on the 
degree of strength. Briefly put, Bacon was a new inductivist, whereas Descartes was 
a new ‘demonstrationist’. On Bacon’s new induction—which was contrasted to 
Aristotelian induction as this was deployed by the Italian neo-Aristotelians7—
knowledge starts with experience and the compilation of a detailed natural-
experimental history of the phenomena under investigation. It is then acquired by 
what is in effect an elimination of alternative hypotheses, via the careful 
construction of tables of presences, absences and concomitant variations. Descartes, 
on the other hand, had no room for induction in his philosophy of nature. But 
though he appealed to a demonstrative ideal of scientific knowledge, his conception 
of demonstration was not Aristotelian syllogistic proof, but more akin to what we 
nowadays call explanation. “There is a big difference between proving and 
explaining”, as he put (1991, 106) it, meaning that demonstration in science can 
proceed either from causes to effects or from effects to causes.  
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Isaac Newton, as is well known, protested against the use of hypotheses in 
science, which he took it to be emblematic of the Cartesian approach, and set forth 
the famous methodological rules for doing science. In a letter to Roger Cotes in 
March 1713, Newton (2004, 120-1) noted: 
 
Experimental Philosophy reduces Phenomena to general Rules & looks upon the Rules to be 
general when they hold generally in Phenomena. It is not enough to object that a contrary 
phenomenon may happen but to make a legitimate objection, a contrary phenomenon must 
be actually produced. Hypothetical Philosophy consists in imaginary explications of things & 
imaginary arguments for or against such explications, or against the arguments of 
Experimental Philosophers founded upon Induction. The first sort of Philosophy is followed by 
me, the latter too much by Cartes, Leibniz & some others. 
 
Experimental natural philosophy was a new way of acquiring scientific knowledge. It 
stressed, among other things, the need to use the phenomena (that is, empirical 
laws) as premises, together with the laws of motion, for the derivation of force laws, 
and conversely. But as Newton explained in the Scholium of Proposition 69 of Book I 
of the Principia, the aim of all this was to argue “more safely” about the physical 
causes of the phenomena.8  
Writing about a century later, Marquis Laplace, one of the greatest Newtonians 
ever, took it that he was enlarging Newton’s method of experimental natural 
philosophy by applying to it the then newly developed mathematical theory of 
probability. At the very same time, however, he was exposing it to criticism that was 
supposed to unravel its weaknesses: “Yet induction, in leading to the discovery of 
the general principles of the sciences, does not suffice to establish them absolutely. 
It is always necessary to confirm them by demonstrations or by decisive experiences; 
for the history of the sciences shows us that induction has sometimes led to inexact 
results” (1951, 177). His objective was to correct this method by strengthening it, 
that is by enhancing the degree of certainty it can attain: “then science acquires the 
highest degree of certainty and of perfection that it is able to attain” (1951, 182-3). 
There is a clear sense in which all those thinkers (and many who followed them) 
were engaged in the same kind of enterprise and doubly so: they were engaged in 
science, in the sense of the special mode of knowledge noted above and they were 
engaged in GPoS too, by developing accounts of the methods appropriate for this 
kind of knowledge and by criticising competing accounts. They all had the same 
starting point, viz., scientific knowledge of the world, and yet the specific 
determinations of the form of scientific knowledge they favoured were different and 
developed, at least partly, by criticising competing determinations. The specific 
determinations of scientific knowledge change over time and the various relevant 
conceptions compete with each other, both synchronically and diachronically. Yet, 
something remains invariant and this is that science is a special mode of knowledge 
which is characterised—in its most abstract form—by the demand of increased (but 
as it turns out never absolute) security and reliability and by the search for methods 
that make this possible.  
 
3.3 The conceptual toolbox of Science-in-General 
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Science-in-general employs a network of concepts—a toolbox, as it were—in order 
to characterise the special form of knowledge it is as well as its relation to the world. 
The knowledge achieved by science offers explanations of various phenomena; it 
unravels causal connections; it is supported by the evidence. Science employs 
theories, hypotheses and principles; it issues in predictions; it relies on experiments. 
Theories represent the phenomena and rely on theoretical concepts and models. The 
reality science investigates is governed by laws of nature. The entities there are in 
the world have properties and powers and they stand in various relations to each 
other. This is just a sample of the network of concepts employed by Science-in-
general. And though it might not be the case that all of them play a role—or 
function—in each and every individual science, it is hard to think of any individual 
science—both in history and as it is practiced today—without some (typically most) 
of these concepts.  
As noted in section 3.1, one important function of GPoS is to offer explications of 
these concepts. At one point in the history of GPoS, it was thought that the task of 
GPoS was to offer formal-syntactic explications. This was the time—associated with 
some Logical Positivists like Carnap—of the ‘logic of science’. The idea was—and it 
was a noble idea—that as it is formally specified when a proposition A entails a 
proposition B (given a formal language), so it should be formally specified when a 
proposition A explains a proposition B; a proposition A confirms a proposition B etc. 
Part of the reason why this idea was noble was that it was meant to secure some 
objective content of a concept when it comes to its applications and to leave issues 
of interpretation open to dispute. This programme failed mostly because the content 
of the concepts under explication was too rich to be formalised. For instance, 
explanation cannot be explicated by being formalised as a species of deduction (see 
the Deductive-Nomological model); not because there are no deductive-nomological 
explanations, but because not all explanation is deductive-nomological. But this does 
not suggest that the task of explication is hopeless. It suggests that, in all probability, 
the rich conceptual structure of the basic concepts of Science-in-general is not 
formalisable and that, in all probability, there will be more than one explicata. It may 
even turn out, as Carnap famously argued for the case of probability, that there are 
two explicanda (in his case: two concepts of probability, one referring to a measure 
of confirmation, and another to a measure of relative frequency). We should not, I 
think, equate the failure of formalisation with the failure of explication. Most 
scientific concepts are explicable, without being formalisable.  
More importantly, explicating a concept is bound to be entangled with the 
explication of a number of other concepts that fix part of its content or ground its 
role. For instance, when we try to explicate the concept of mechanism, concepts 
such as power, explanation, causation, laws of nature and others are involved. GPoS 
in its explicative function works with clusters of concepts and elucidates all of them 
as networks. The concept of mechanism, for instance, has had a diachronic 
occurrence in science, (and in various particular sciences) and there have been (and 
still are) important controversies about its content and its connections with other 
concepts such as causation. As I have shown in some detail in my (2011a), the 
prevalent accounts of mechanism, though motivated by considerations in various 
particular sciences, are being offered—and justly so—as general explications of a 
central concept that occurs (or can occur) in any theory or science. This case—the 
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explication of mechanism—is a good example of the explicative function of GPoS 
because explication, though not offering a formalisation of a concept, does offer a 
theoretical account of it; it unravels its inner structure (and hence what kinds of 
ontic commitments follow from adopting a certain explication as opposed to 
another); and it makes apparent the connections of this concept with others. In fact, 
further explicative work suggests that there are two explicanda when it comes to 
mechanism: Mechanical Mechanism and Non-mechanical mechanism (see my 2011a 
for the details). 
 
4. The four dimension of General Philosophy of Science 
Given an understanding of Science-in-general, and the two functions of GPoS, we 
can become more specific about the role and significance of GPoS. There are four 
major dimensions along which the philosophical study of Science-in-general takes 
place: an epistemic, a metaphysical, a conceptual and a practical.  
The epistemic dimension deals with a family of issues that have to do with the 
epistemic credentials of science and in particular with the status of scientific 
knowledge. Science is not merely a theoretical and experimental practice—it is also 
(and has always been taken to be) a mode of knowledge. It purports to describe and 
explain the world and employs special methods which offer a systematic 
understanding of the natural (and the social) phenomena. It relies on theories, 
hypotheses and principles which, typically but not invariably, go beyond the 
observable aspects of the world and describe the world as possessing a hidden-to-
the-senses causal-explanatory structure. These theories are not entailed by the 
available evidence but are supported or licensed by the evidence. The methods 
employed in science are, typically, ampliative: the output of the application of the 
method exceeds in content the input of the method; hence there is supposed to be a 
problem not just of describing the way these methods work, but also of grounding or 
justifying their use. And there is the perennial question of how seriously we should 
take the scientific image of the world as being a true or true-like image and 
(relatedly) whether we should think of science as aiming to offer a true image of the 
world in order to have a just view of science.  
The metaphysical dimension deals with a network of issues that have to do with 
the implications of the scientific image of the world about the basic ontological 
categories of the natural (and social) world as well as its connection with the 
manifest image of the world and its own ontic structure. Scientific theories describe 
the world as being subject to laws and causal connections between various entities 
and processes; they postulate various entities, properties and structures; they deal 
with natural kinds and species and genera; they purport to unravel the mechanisms 
that generate or support various functions and behaviours. Two big traditions have 
fought over the ontic structure of the scientific image of the world: one inflates 
ontology in order to explain and ground the regularity there is in the world; the 
other takes regularity as a brute fact; the first posits natural necessities and powers 
in nature; the second does away with regularity-enforcers and advances a 
metaphysically thin conception of laws of nature.9 When it comes to the relation 
between the scientific image of the world and the manifest image, the lines of 
                                                          
9
 For a recent attempt to develop this view see my (2014a). 
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controversy concern not only the issue of ontic priority (which is the real image of 
the world?) but also the issue of their connection.  
The conceptual dimension deals with a cluster of issues that have to do with the 
ways scientific theories represent the world as well as with the conditions of 
representational success. Science represents the world via theories and theories 
employ a number of representational media, from language, to models, to diagrams 
etc. Scientific theories employ, almost invariably, idealisations and abstractions in 
representing natural phenomena. Scientific concepts acquire their content, to a large 
extent at least, via the theories in which they occur. But experiments too play a 
significant role in fixing the content of scientific concepts. In fact, theories have to 
have empirical content and their abstract (typically but not invariably mathematical) 
structure has to make contact with the world as this is given to humans in 
experience. The theory-ladenness of the conceptual structure of scientific theories 
generates a number of problems that have to do with how best to understand 
conceptual connections between theories; how best to evaluate the 
representational content of theories; and how best to understand their relation to 
experience and experiment. 
The practical dimension deals with a number of issues that have to do with 
ethical, social and other practical—that is, relating to scientific praxis—issues. 
Science is far from being value-free, and the investigation of the place, role and 
function of values in science has been an important element of our thinking about 
science. Values do not function as methods do; yet, they are constitutively involved 
in scientific judgements and in theory-choice and evaluation in science. They are 
epistemic values as well as social ones and understanding their interconnections, as 
well as their role in securing the objectivity of science, is indispensable for having a 
view about science and its role in society. Feminist approaches to science have 
played a key role in uncovering various cognitive and social biases and have 
promoted the image of a socially responsible science. Issues about the ethics of 
science, the structure of scientific research, risk-analysis and the role of science (and 
of the scientists and the scientific institutions) in policy making have acquired 
prominence.  
Though it is methodologically useful to separate these four dimensions, in 
practice, they are intertwined. More importantly, they are all indispensable for 
having science in view. The issues that form each dimension (a sample of which was 
offered above) have a long history and have been subject to important theoretical 
debates and controversies. Hence a proper engagement with general philosophy of 
science should be both conceptual and historical. The rich history of general 
philosophy of science suggests that the core of the issues that characterise 
philosophical engagement with science remain the same in form throughout history, 
though their context, content and the resources available for addressing them have 
changed over time.  
 
4.1 Unobservables: from medicine to atomism 
As an example, let me mention the issue of the scientific method(s). Though it is true 
that there is no account of the method which can invariably and accurately 
characterise all individual sciences and all historical epochs, it is also true that 
science has been taken to be a special way of getting to know the world, which is 
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characterised by two basic features: it is ampliative and it is epistemically warranted. 
Hence, science is different from mere opinion and it purports to extend and enlarge 
our conception of the world as this is given to us by our senses and our memory. 
Employing methods which succeed in satisfying these two features has always been 
a key philosophical and scientific endeavour. This endeavour invites two lines of 
theoretical investigation, as noted above. The first is to devise and describe models 
of methods that purport to satisfy these desiderata; the second is to show that the 
thus described models manage to meet these two (prima facie conflicting) 
desiderata—that is, to justify them. This kind of double philosophical endeavour has 
preoccupied most scientists and philosophers of science ever since Aristotle 
identified it as an issue in his Posterior Analytics. And no matter how far back we go 
in time and how far apart in disciplines, we encounter the same form of the problem.  
 Here is a selective, but representative, historical illustration of the idea that the 
form of the problem of the method has a considerable degree of invariance. The 
starting point of this illustration has, I think, the advantage that it is not widely 
discussed among philosophers of science. It concerns the debates about method in 
ancient Greek medicine. For about three centuries (roughly from 300 BCE), there 
were two competing schools not just for practicing medicine, but for doing science 
too. The ancient empirics were a group of doctors in the latter part of the third 
century BC who took it that in practicing the art of medicine, doctors should rely on 
experience (empeiria) alone.10 Empiricism was developed, at least partly, as a 
reaction to the proliferation of theories in medical practice. Empirics attacked what 
they took it to be the dominant school in medicine—the so-called rationalists or 
dogmatists (λογικοί/δογματικοί), who, taking cues from the Stoic theory of signs, 
argued that there is a special kind of rational inference—called indicative inference—
which enables the transition from an effect to its invisible cause. In particular, the 
rationalists thought that medicine should be based on understanding and finding the 
causes of a disease and that this required development of theories about the nature 
of things and the powers of the causes and of the remedies (cf. Galen, 1985). 
Indicative inferences were supposed to be grounded on relations of “rational 
consequence” among distinct existences—relations which were discoverable by 
means of reason only.  
Against all this, empiricists were putting forward the sola experientia account of 
medical knowledge and practice. Medicine, empiricists said, is the accumulation of 
empirical generalisations—called theorems. This accumulation is based on autopsy 
(that is, on one’s own observations) and history (that is, reports on other 
practitioners’ observations). How then can there be theoretical novelty in medicine? 
The thought that prevailed was that this was achieved by transition to the similar 
(την του ομοίου μετάβασιν/de similis transitione). This was taken to be a method 
(way) of invention (οδός ευρεύσεως) (cf. Galen 1985, 5). Yet, there was some active 
debate about the status of this principle, whose justification is not obvious. The 
dogmatists were quick to point out that this kind of transition could be justified only 
                                                          
10
 The founder of the sect (αίρεσις), as it came to be known, was Philinus of Cos (around 260BC), but 
the school spread well into the first few centuries AD. The main proponents of empiricism were 
Serapion (fl 225 BC) and later on Menodotus, Theodas and Heraclides. Our knowledge of their 
writings comes mostly from Galen, Sextus Empiricus (who was a sceptic philosopher and an empiricist 
doctor) and Celsus. 
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if it was accepted that the nature of things was such that they resembled each other 
(Galen 1985, 70). In response to this, the empiricists insisted that any justification of 
this principle—that is of the principle ‘similar cause, similar effect’— should be based 
on experience (Galen 1985, 70). They therefore wanted to make it clear that there is 
no experience-independent justification of the principle that underwrites the 
transition to the similar.  
At stake was the issue of the status and justification of methods that enlarge our 
image of the world by taking us beyond experience. This issue came into sharp focus 
in the debate about the status of indicative inference. The key problem was the 
knowledge of non-apparent things (άδηλα), which the dogmatists thought was 
necessary for medicine, but was going beyond experience. The empiricist doctors 
joined forces with the sceptic philosophers (in fact, some were both) in order to 
curtail the rashness of reason, as Sextus (2000, Book I §20) put it.  
According to Sextus (2000, Book ΙΙ, §§97-98), the Dogmatists divided entities into 
two epistemological categories: (a) pre-evident things (πρόδηλα) and (b) non-
evident things (άδηλα). The former are immediately evident in experience without 
recourse to inference; they come of themselves to our knowledge, as Sextus put it, 
e.g. that it is day. The non-evident things are divided into three sub-categories. (b1) 
those which are non-evident once and for all (καθάπαξ άδηλα), e.g., that the stars 
are even in number; (b2) those which are non-evident for the moment (προς καιρόν 
άδηλα); (b3) those that are non-evident by nature (φύσει άδηλα). The real issue was 
between b2 and b3, Sextus thought. Temporarily non-evident things have an evident 
nature but are made non-evident for the moment by certain external circumstances 
(e.g., for me now, the city of the Athenians). Naturally non-evident things are those 
whose nature is such that they cannot be grasped in experience, e.g. Sextus says, 
imperceptible pores – for these are never apparent of themselves but would be 
deemed to be apprehended, if at all, by way of something else, e.g. by sweating or 
something similar (2000, Book ΙΙ §§97-98). 
Things which are temporarily non-evident and things which are naturally non-
evident are apprehended through signs. There are two kinds of sign. Recollective or 
commemorative (υπομνηστικά) signs, and indicative (ενδεικτικά) signs; and 
correspondingly, two kinds of inference. The difference between the two concerns 
the types of things involved in the two inferential procedures. Temporarily non-
evident things are known by recollective signs, whereas naturally non-evident things 
are apprehended via indicative signs (2000, Book II §100) 
The standard ancient example of a recollective sign is smoke, as in the case: if 
there is smoke, there is fire. The fire is temporarily non-evident, but knowing that 
there’s no smoke without fire, we can infer that there’s fire. So recollective sign-
inferences take us from an evident entity to another entity which is temporarily non-
evident, but which can be made evident. Indicative-sign inferences take us from an 
evident thing to another thing which is naturally non-evident. The standard ancient 
example was the case of sweating as indicative of its non-evident cause (pores in the 
skin). But there was also another type of dispute: the conclusion of an indicative 
inference was supposed to be licensed by the fact that the effect (the sign) was 
necessarily connected with the cause (the signified) and flew out of its “proper 
nature and constitution”, (as bodily movements are signs of the soul), as Sextus put 
it. The commemorative sign-inference, on the other hand, was based on the 
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recollection of the past co-occurrence of the evident effect and the temporarily non-
evident cause. Upon the observation of the evident effect, we are led to recall “the 
thing which has been observed together with it and is not now making an evident 
impression on us (as in the case of smoke and fire)”. So the commemorative 
inference was supposed to be grounded on past experience and to implicate the 
memory.  
 The issue of the distinction between indicative inferences and commemorative 
ones was centrally disputed among the ancient physicians and philosophers. The 
empiricists employed special technical terminology to map this distinction. They 
called indicative sign-inference ‘analogism’; and commemorative sign-inference 
‘epilogism’. Like in the case of Sextus, the key argument of empiricists in favour of 
epilogism was that the kind of inference involved in it, being directed towards visible 
things, is “an inference common and universally used by the whole of mankind” 
(Galen 1985, 133; 135). Analogism, on the other hand, was not universally accepted, 
because of the invisibility of the things involved in it (Galen 1985, 139; see also 
Sextus 2000 Book II §102). 
 This kind of debate came to a halt (temporarily) when Galen provided a synthesis 
of the views of the two sects—a via media—by claiming that empiricism should be 
open to theory but theory should be open to empirical testing. Reporting his own 
views, Galen suggested a need for a “reasoned account” to be added to what is 
known from experience. This reasoned account (a theory) should be tested in 
experience either by finding confirming instances or by disconfirming it “by what is 
known in perception” (1985, 89).  
 And yet, the form (and at least part of the content) of this debate resurfaced in 
the seventeenth century, in the context of the mechanical conception of nature. In 
his Syntagma Philosophicum (1658/1972), Pierre Gassendi borrowed the distinction 
between indicative inference and commemorative one from the ancient doctors and 
philosophers, and argued for principles that can act as a bridge between the 
macroscopic world and the corpuscularian world of the new mechanical philosophy. 
For Gassendi, there are circumstances under which the conclusion of indicative 
inference can be legitimate. This happens, he said, when the sign can exist in one 
circumstance; that is, when there is only one explanation of the presence of the sign 
(hence, when there no competing explanations). Interestingly, this cuts through the 
visible/invisible distinction. Though Gassendi agreed with the ancient empirics that 
indicative inferences differ from commemorative ones in the type of entities 
implicated in them—entities invisible by nature (occultae as nature) vs entities 
temporarily invisible (res ad tempus occultae)—he argued that probable knowledge 
of invisible by nature things (such as the atoms and void) is thereby possible. Note 
that at the very time that Gassendi was allowing inferential knowledge of 
unobservables, he was transforming the conception of knowledge appropriate for ‘la 
verite des sciences’ allowing lesser degrees of certainty than his contemporary 
Descartes.  
 The terminology that Gassendi borrowed from Sextus to describe the method 
that was taken to generate and justify belief in unobservable atoms was likely lost in 
subsequent discussions, but the form of the issue resurfaced again and again in 
different contexts—most notably in the debates over atomism and the kinetic theory 
of gases towards the end of the nineteenth century. There the issue, as the physical 
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chemist Jean Perrin (1916, xii) put it, was the explanation of “the visible in terms of 
the invisible” and the grounds for its legitimacy. The fault-line was among those who 
took it that enlarging the image of the world by positing unobservables was, strictly 
speaking, beyond the bounds of science and in the vicinity of metaphysics and those 
who took it that this enlargement was indispensable for understanding the world 
and licensed by ordinary scientific methods. None of the sides of this debate was 
monolithic in its approach and arguments. In fact, new arguments turned out to be 
taken to be relevant and prominent—one of them being what Ludwig Boltzmann 
(1900) called ‘the historical principle’, viz., that the history of science has shown that 
theoretical attempts to expand our scientific image of the world by positing 
unobservable entities have ended up in failure. Another argument, addressed by 
Pierre Duhem (1906, 88-89) against Gassendi, was that atoms and other 
unobservables are so unlike ordinary objects that any inference to them should be a 
matter of the imagination and not of reason. Still, the key issues of the debate 
were—essentially—invariant. 
 After his famous work on the Brownian motion and its explanation on the basis of 
the kinetic theory of gases, Jean Perrin—who like Pierre Duhem was a scientist and 
not a ‘professional’ philosopher—summarised his overall approach as follows (1916, 
vii): “To divine in this way the existence and properties of objects that still lie outside 
our ken, to explain the complications of the visible in terms of invisible simplicity is 
the function of the intuitive intelligence which, thanks to men such as Dalton and 
Boltzmann, has given us the doctrine of Atoms”. Perrin’s point, as he described in a 
piece on the method in physical chemistry he published in 1919—in a volume titled 
‘the methods of the sciences’—was not to denigrate inductive methods (purportedly 
staying at the level of sensible entities), nor to promote exclusively deductive 
methods (aiming at explanation in terms of invisible entities). Rather, as he put it, 
“the indefinite wealth of nature does not lock itself in a single formula”; hence 
cooperation various methods is required. Still, trying to “eliminate completely 
invisible elements”, like many of his contemporary advocates of energetic wanted to 
do, would amount to leaving the image of the world unsupported—very much like 
removing the pillars that support a cathedral (1919, 87). 
 A number of significant details of this episodic account have been glossed over.11 
But I take it the intended message is clear enough. This is only an example of how 
one central problem of GPoS—whether and how science should expand and extend 
the image of the world by positing unobservable entities—has kept both its form and 
its significance throughout the centuries and the disciplines. To use current jargon, 
this might be taken to be the problem of scientific realism, though this is a label we 
and not most of the protagonists in the various incarnations of this debate are prone 
to use. It became a standard problem within GPoS in the twentieth century partly 
because this expansion of the image of the world by positing invisible elements has 
become the norm in most—if not all—of the sciences. It is noteworthy—and it is 
occasionally forgotten—that a great deal of the revival of interest in scientific 
realism in the early 1950s was related to issues in psychology and the status of the 
so-called ‘intervening variables’ and ‘hypothetical constructs’ in moving away from 
behaviourist approached to mentality (cf. MacCorquodale & Meehl 1948). But the 
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 I have told most of the details in 2011b. 
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problem of scientific realism became a standard problem within GPoS for another 
reason. Precisely because of its generality and resilience it can provide a conceptual 
umbrella under which a number of other problems of the scientific image of the 
world can be subsumed and discussed; for instance, the role of explanation in 
science; the relation between evidence and theory; the status of scientific truth; 
rationality of theory-change and others.12  
 
5. GPoS vs Philosophy of X? 
There is no doubt that the philosophies of the various sciences have flourished over 
the last forty or so years. There is also no doubt that GPoS was physics-centred until 
fairly recently. But this trend has been reversed and GPoS has been more pluralistic 
in its relations with the individual sciences. But though, as noted already, the subject 
matter of GPoS is Science-in-general and not the various individual sciences, GPoS 
and the philosophies of the various sciences form a seamless web.  
 What we normally call science X (physics, biology, chemistry, economics, 
psychology etc) is itself a kind of rational abstraction. It’s hard to come up with an 
interesting definition of, say, physics; the subject-matter of physics—as well as the 
name—has changed over time. The expression ‘natural philosophy’ was used to 
refer to physics until roughly the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1798, the 
Academie Royale des Sciences of Paris set the following topic as a prize competition 
in physics: “the nature, form and used of the liver in the various classes of animals”. 
In 1918, when Max Planck was awarded the Nobel Prize in physics, the citation of the 
Swedish Academy of Sciences noted that the award was given “in recognition of 
[Planck’s] epoch-making investigations into the quantum theory”. In practice, physics 
comprises a number of fields and disciplines, from mechanics to high-energy physics, 
to solid-state physics, to physical chemistry and a good many others. Physics, if 
anything, is a cluster of sciences and disciplines, as these have evolved over time. 
Philosophy of Physics is the philosophy-of-physics-in general! And, as we all know, 
there are various philosophies of sub-X within the philosophy of X: philosophy of 
spacetime; philosophy of quantum mechanics; philosophy of statistical mechanics, 
philosophy of string theory and so on. Philosophy of Physics, then, stands to the 
philosophies of various physical sub-disciplines as GPoS stands to philosophies of the 
various sciences. The same holds for the Philosophy of Biology, for example. Biology, 
strictly speaking, is a cluster of sciences or disciplines: ecology, paleontology, 
synthetic biology and others. Actually, a new cluster of biological sciences has been 
formed: ‘life sciences’. The philosophy of biology-in-general stands to the 
philosophies of various biological sub-disciplines as GPoS stands to philosophies of 
the various sciences. And as there are no impermeable boundaries among the 
philosophy of X and the philosophies of sub-X, so there are no impermeable barriers 
between GPoS and the Philosophies of X, where X ranges over individual sciences. 
This permeability is strengthened by the fact that new hybrid disciplines are being 
formed, e.g., molecular biology or biophysics. And with them, there is transfer of 
methods, theories and techniques as well as conceptual problems.  
The Philosophy of X-in-general deals with some issues that are not proper tasks of 
GPoS. One such issue is the interpretation of the various theories of X; for any theory 
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 For the issue of scientific realism in the twentieth century see my 2011. 
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T in X, there is the question what the world is like according to T. If there are 
competing interpretations—or even theories—there is the further issue of how they 
are related. And there is always the issue of the basic conceptual structure of a 
theory T in X—that is, of the content of the key explanatory concepts of T. And of 
course, there is the issue of how the sub-disciplines of X are related to each other. 
Hence, there are questions and issues that belong—more or less squarely—to the 
philosophies of X, where X ranges over individual sciences. In the philosophy of 
biology, for instance, there are issues concerning the concept of reproductive 
fitness; or the ontological status of the probabilities used in population biology; or 
the understanding of gene in Mendelian and molecular genetics. In the philosophy of 
chemistry, there are issues concerning the status of explanations in terms of electron 
orbitals; whether there are some irreducibly chemical laws, e.g., the periodic law of 
the elements; the issue of ‘chemical substances’, e.g., whether the world consists of 
one kind of matter or of a great variety of materials; the relation between chemistry 
and physics. In philosophy of physics, there are the famous issues of the 
interpretations of quantum mechanics; the nature of space and time; the status of 
probabilities in statistical mechanics and many others. 
Dealing with philosophical issues that arise within the Philosophy of X requires, 
among other things, an engagement with the sciences or the disciplines themselves 
that are investigated. The Philosophy of X is in many ways the abstract and 
theoretical end of X itself. But the Philosophy of X (or the Philosophy of X in general, 
as I would like to put it), qua philosophy of science, employs and explores the 
conceptual resources of GPoS. It performs the two functions of GPoS, the explicative 
and the critical, at the level of X. In many ways, it deals with problems of GPoS, as 
they are concretised in individual sciences. The idea of explanation in evolutionary 
theory is a case in point. Elliott Sober (1984), for instance, relied on the composition 
of forces in dynamics in order to account for the change in gene frequencies over 
time as the result of different ‘forces’, such as selection, drift, and mutation. And so 
is the issue of laws of nature: are there laws in biology or chemistry? And the issue of 
the structure of theories in biology. For instance, evolutionary theory has been taken 
to support the ‘semantic view of theories’.  
In fact, there are areas in which the philosophical investigation of issues in the 
philosophy of X have exerted serious influence on how the relevant issues are 
treated within GPoS. One important such issue has been the nature of biological 
species. These do not conform to standard philosophical approaches to natural 
kinds, especially when the latter a viewed as possessing essences. A fruitful 
discussion has opened up about how best to reconceptualise natural kinds or even 
whether the traditional reliance on natural kinds should be rejected.  
But we should not lose sight of the fact that there are philosophical questions that 
belong—more or less squarely—to GPoS. I have already offered an outline of the 
issues dealt with in the four dimensions of GPoS. But I want to add two issues that I 
think they are really peculiar to GPoS.  
The first, unsurprisingly, is the scientific realism debate. This debate does not 
concern any science in particular. And this is so, because the heart of the problem is 
about Science-in-general: can and should we trust the scientific image of the world? 
Think of the challenge of the pessimistic induction, for example. This concerns the 
very idea that science is in a position to offer knowledge of the world. The challenge, 
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as is well known, utilises the history of science to undercut confidence in the current 
scientific image of the world. It does that by noting that there is a pattern of 
theoretical-explanatory failure in the history of science which warrants the claim 
that, in all probability, current scientific theories will be abandoned and replaced in 
the years to come, despite their impressive empirical success. The details of this 
debate can be found in my (1999) and Stanford (2006). The point I want to stress is 
that this kind of argument is a global argument about science and not about the 
particular sciences. 
In fact, if we were to break it down to sub-arguments concerning the various 
individual sciences, e.g., biology, physics, chemistry etc., we might be able to 
undermine it. For, even if there is radical theory-change in physics, there is not, it 
seems, a pattern of radical theory-change in biology or in chemistry. This kind of 
dividing strategy would possibly warrant the claim that we can be more confident 
about our current theoretical knowledge in biology than we are in physics. But this 
kind of strategy would not remove the need to address the argument from the 
pessimistic induction globally. For unless there are relevant differences in the ways 
we acquire scientific knowledge in, say, physics and biology, the alleged failures in 
physics would still undermine the alleged successes in biology or chemistry. The 
strength of the argument from the pessimistic induction lies precisely in its 
undermining the relations between explanatory and empirical success and truth. 
Hence, the attempts to neutralise the pessimistic induction should aim to restore a 
connection between empirical success and truth, even if this connection is subtler 
and more sensitive to the history of science than, perhaps, was accepted before.  
As I have argued elsewhere (2009, 75-77), when it comes to the realism debate, a 
key task of GPoS is to address the issue of balancing two types of evidence for or 
against a scientific theory. The first kind is whatever evidence there is in favour (or 
against) a specific scientific theory. This evidence has to do with the degree of 
confirmation of the theory at hand. It is first-order evidence and is typically 
associated with whatever scientists take into account when they form an attitude 
towards a theory. It can be broadly understood to include some of the theoretical 
virtues of the theory at hand—of the kind that typically go into plausibility 
judgements associated with assignment of prior probability to theories. The second 
kind of evidence (second-order evidence) comes from the past record of scientific 
theories and/or from meta-theoretical (philosophical) considerations that have to do 
with the reliability of scientific methodology. It concerns not particular scientific 
theories, but science as a whole. This second-order evidence feeds claims such as 
those that motivate the Pessimistic Induction. Actually, this second-order evidence is 
multi-faceted—it is negative (showing limitations and shortcomings) as well as 
positive (showing how learning from experience can be improved).  
This balancing cannot be settled in the abstract—that is without looking into the 
details of the various cases. But the need for balancing shows how GPoS and the 
Philosophies of X can work in harmony. For, in most typical cases, settling issues 
about the first-order evidence there is for a theory of X will be a matter of the 
Philosophy of X (subject, as we have noted in section 2.1 of a general account of the 
relation between evidence and theory), whereas settling issues about the second-
order evidence there is from the history of science or the conceptual structure of 
Science-in-general will be a matter of GPoS. 
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The second issue that predominantly belongs to GPoS concerns the very idea of a 
scientific image of the world. GPoS offers the space in which the various images of 
the world provided by the individual sciences are fused together into a stereoscopic 
view of reality. Strictly speaking, the various sciences offer us perspectives on reality. 
They employ different kinds of taxonomic categories and conceptualise the world by 
means of different structures of concepts. The category of ‘chemical bond’, for 
instance, belongs to a different conceptual structure than the category ‘gene’ or 
‘quark’. Still, there is a presumption—to say the least—that the various perspectives 
offered by the various sciences or theories are perspectives of the same world. 
Hence there is the need to put together the scientific image of the world; to look at 
the various interconnections among the ‘partial’ images generated by the individual 
sciences; and to clear up tensions and conflicts. This is precisely the kind of job that 
GPoS—and only GPoS—can do. It offers a more global (but not absolute) perspective 
on reality—for seeing the whole picture. Even if there is no way to put together a 
coherent and unified image of the world, even if, that is, the scientific image is 
characteristically disunified and disconnected, this can be ‘seen’ only within GPoS.  
GPoS offers the toolkit of concepts that are needed for establishing the relations 
among various partial images. Employing the expression ‘special sciences’ to refer to 
sciences other than fundamental physics did play a useful role in promoting anti-
reductivist approaches to the relations between the various sciences, but it was a 
misnomer! There are no special sciences; or, all sciences are special in that they offer 
perspectives on reality. The matter of ‘putting together’ these perspectives is a 
central task of GPoS, but here again GPoS should be engaged in both of its functions. 
It should aim to explicate (and examine the conceptual networks) of key concepts 
such as reduction, supervenience, fundamentality, emergence, dependence and the 
like. It should aim to criticise the various theoretical accounts concerning the 
relations among the various sciences—as these were determined both conceptually 
and historically. 
 
6. Concluding thoughts 
I have argued that GPoS can work in harmony with the philosophies of the various 
sciences and that, strictly speaking, the philosophies of the various individual 
sciences require the framework and functions of GPoS. The particular sciences, and 
the various theories in them, are in many ways dissimilar to each other: both in their 
historical development and their current conceptual and methodological structures. 
Still, science need not have an essence for it to be the object of philosophical study. 
Nor should the philosophical study of science be merely descriptive of whatever is 
taught in Science departments. GPoS has two important functions vis-à-vis Science-
in-general: one explicative and another critical. Science-in-general is itself a ‘rational 
abstraction’, the unity of which arises from the identity of the subject of the various 
sciences, viz., that science is special mode of knowledge of nature, and the identity of 
the object of the various sciences, viz., nature itself. As Leibniz states in the epigram 
of this chapter: “Similarity in variety, that is, diversity compensated by identity”.  
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